Statistical clustering of criminal events can be used by crime analysts to create of lists of potential suspects for an unsolved crime, identify groups of crimes that may have been committed by the same individuals or group of individuals, for offender profiling, and for predicting future events. In this paper, we propose a Bayesian model-based clustering approach for criminal events. Our approach is semi-supervised because the offender is known for a subset of the events, and utilizes spatiotemporal crime locations as well as crime features describing the offender's modus operandi. The hierarchical model naturally handles complex features often seen in crime data, including missing data, interval censored event times, and a mix of discrete and continuous variables. In addition, our Bayesian model produces posterior clustering probabilities which allow analysts to act on model output only as warranted. We illustrate the approach using a large data set of burglaries in 2009-2010 in Baltimore County, Maryland.
Partially-supervised spatiotemporal clustering for burglary crime series identification
Introduction
Advanced statistical methods are increasingly being used to aid in criminal investigations. One objective is to cluster crime events that share a common offender or group of co-offenders. As an investigative tool, the results from clustering will allow crime analysts to operate more efficiently and effectively by jointly investigating crimes that likely share a common offender instead of investigating each crime individually (Grubin et al., 2001; . Clustering can also be useful for discovering previously unknown serial offenders or identifying additional crimes that are part of a series. In addition, practical interest is often focused on identifying who is responsible for a set of crimes (suspect prioritization). In this case, a set of crimes with unknown offender(s) is compared to the crimes committed by a given set of suspects (perhaps from past offending records). This calls for a type of semi-supervised clustering, where the known series of past offenses are labeled (i.e. associated to their own cluster) providing a direct way to incorporate suspect information. New crimes can then be examined to determine how closely they are related to existing clusters corresponding to the crimes committed by known individuals or groups. This can potentially provide information on the type of offender (offender profiling) and inform on future behavior (next-event prediction).
One of the primary uses for criminal cluster analysis is in crime linkage. Crime linkage often refers to several connected but slightly different tasks, all of which may be employed in the course of a police investigation. First, crime linkage can refer to the process of linking crimes to other crimes (that share common offender(s)). We refer to pairwise case linkage as the processes of determining if a given pair of crimes share the same offender or group of cooffenders. This is essentially a binary classification problem where each crime pair is considered independently. Extending beyond crime pairs, crime series identification, or series linkage, is the process of identifying the set of crimes that share a common offender or group of co-offenders.
Crime linkage may also refer to the process of linking crimes to offenders. We refer to suspect identification as the process of identifying the offender or group of co-offenders responsible for a crime or set of crimes by comparing the unsolved crime(s) to the past offenders ' crime series.
The majority of the research related to linkage analysis has focused on (pairwise) behavioral case linkage. Also known as comparative case analysis (Bennell and Canter, 2002) , behavioral case linkage attempts to determine if the same offender(s) committed two crimes on the basis of modus operandi (MO) evidence rather than physical or forensic evidence (e.g. DNA, fingerprint).
The MO behavior exhibited by an offender can include, inter alia, aspects of their site selection (where they choose to commit an offense), the timing, methods for carrying out the crime, and what they did during the commission of the crime. Practically, the premise of behavioral case linkage is that offenders behave consistently across their crime series and distinctively amongst the other criminals in the region (Canter, 2004; . As such, the main emphasis in case linkage research has been in determining how well the assumptions regarding consistency and distinctiveness hold. This has resulted in numerous studies detailing the performance of several case linkage methods across a variety of crime types (Brown and Hagen, 2003; Bennell and Jones, 2005; Goodwill and Alison, 2006; Lin and Brown, 2006; Cocx and Kosters, 2006; Woodhams and Toye, 2007; Tonkin et al., 2008; Bennell et al., 2009; Markson et al., 2010; Tonkin et al., 2011 Tonkin et al., , 2012 Woodhams and Labuschagne, 2012) .
Expanding consideration beyond crime pairs, crime series identification seeks to find all of the crimes corresponding to the same offender(s). This can be performed simultaneously for all crimes through clustering (Adderley and Musgrove, 2001; Ma et al., 2010) for the purpose of deriving groups of similar crimes for further investigation or even offender profiles. Alternatively, focus can be on identifying all the crimes sharing a cluster with a particular crime or set of crimes.
This could be useful for investigative or interrogative purposes by providing a list of additional crimes that a suspect may have committed. For example, Adderley and Musgrove (2003) and Adderley (2004) use data mining methods to identify all the unsolved crimes that were similar to the crimes perpetrated by a known criminal group and known single offender respectively.
Another practical use of crime linkage is in suspect identification. This task attempts to link crimes to offenders by comparing a particular crime to the crimes known to a perpetrated by a set of past offenders. As the focus is often on suspect prioritization, or developing a ranked list of suspects, several classification methods have been employed (Yokota and Watanabe, 2002; Santtila et al., 2004 Santtila et al., , 2005 Ewart et al., 2005; Snook et al., 2006; Canter and Hammond, 2007; Santtila et al., 2008; Salo et al., 2013) . By restricting the suspects to a known set of offenders, these approaches are essentially conditioning on the crime in question belonging to one of the known series. This paper presents a Bayesian model-based clustering methodology that fuses spatial and temporal information with features of the crimes (e.g., method of entry), crime scenes (e.g., type of property), and offenders (e.g., their crime history) to identify crime clusters. Instead of an unsupervised approach (where no crimes are attributed to an offender), our partially-supervised model can incorporate identifying information about the known offenders of crimes (i.e., the labels) when that information is available. Including this additional source of data will help accurately identify the true crime series. Model-based clustering (Fraley and Raftery, 1998 ) is an attractive choice for crime events because it is straightforward to include both solved and unsolved crimes, it directly models the distribution of the crime features across the crimes of an offender, and thus allows for prior expert knowledge to be included in the clustering algorithm.
Our hierarchical Bayesian model also naturally handles missing data and interval censoring (the time of an event is only known to be in an interval) which are very common features of crime data, and provides uncertainty assessment for all model parameters, including the relative influence of each feature (space, time, method of entry, etc.) in the model. Finally, our approach provides the posterior probability that each pair of crimes are linked. This allows crime analysts to act on the evidence only as appropriate. For example, our model provides a list of the ten most likely criminals associated with an unsolved crime, but if no criminal is associated with probability higher than 0.05, then crime analysts may choose not to take action based on this information.
Baltimore burglary data
In order to help motivate the development of our model, this section describes some aspects of the crime data we subsequently use for analysis. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the crime events. Baltimore County participates in the Regional Crime Analysis Program (RCAP) which facilitates the sharing of crime data across jurisdictional boundaries. As such, some crime events (0.7%) were located outside of Baltimore
County, but as they were suspected to be part of a series occurring inside the borders of the county, they were included in the data set and subsequently used in our analysis. Unfortunately, we do not have the information on the criteria they used to select these cases. Only 47, or 0.4% of the spatial coordinates were missing.
Because burglaries often occur when the victim is away from their property (Catalano, 2010) , uncertainty is prevalent in the event timing. Thus, the crime records include the temporal interval in which the crime occurred (i.e. the event times are interval censored). Table 1 shows the empirical distribution for the time interval length. Notice that only 20% of crimes have an exact time recorded and 48% have an interval shorter than 6 hours. Because there is so much uncertainty, using only one point (e.g. earliest time, midpoint, latest time) to represent the event time could result in bias (Ratcliffe, 2002) . In Section 3, we describe how uncertainty in the event times are incorporated into our model. This interval-censoring based approach is slightly different than aorisitic analysis (Ratcliffe, 2000 (Ratcliffe, , 2002 . An aoristic analysis deals only with missing times and typically assumes missing times are uniformly distributed; our analysis handles missing times as part of a larger analysis and thus uses more information to deal with missingness. Using such an interval censoring approach, we estimate the crime rate over the analysis period in Figure Figure 3 shows that there are clear differences between the weekday and weekend crime patterns. On weekdays, there is a spike in burglaries between the late morning and early afternoon.
This spike is missing on the weekends which experience a rise in crime late at night. Because Glass 9%, Missing 17%. To reduce the number of category levels, for each of the three factors we recategorized the levels with the smallest counts as "Other". Lumping rare (unconventional) events together into an "other" category is certainly not necessary, but it reduces the uncertainty that comes from estimating many small probabilities. In our method, two crimes with the same category, including "other" as the response for the same feature (say point of entry) is taken as evidence of similarity. However, an "other" for point of entry and an "other" for method of entry would not be used as evidence of similarity.
Of the n = 11,524 burglaries, 2264 are considered solved (i.e. an arrest was made and an offender ID has been assigned to the crime). The solved crimes were perpetrated by a total of 2032 different offenders (assuming that each unique offender ID corresponds to one individual). However, several crimes had multiple offenders. For use in our clustering model, the solved crimes must be pre-assigned to groups. We choose to define a group as a unique set of offenders. Thus all the crimes that offender A and offender B committed together are grouped together. However, if some crimes were only committed by offender A or if some crimes were committed with the help of offender C, then they would be in a separate groups. While this leads to some group overlap (i.e. an offender can belong to multiple groups), it prevents the grouping together of long series of crimes from multiple offenders. Approaches other than declaring all unique combinations of offenders as separate groups would be very complex. One could imagine that each individual offender has certain preferences, and a group of offenders takes some combination of its individuals' preferences. But specifying a model for this would require strong assumptions.
In total, this gave 1576 groups. The distribution of group size (number of offenders) and crimes per group is given in Table 1 . The majority of groups are comprised of a single offender (72%) and 16% of groups have some overlap with another group. Also, most groups are known to have committed only a single crime (84%).
Model-based clustering for burglary data
Denote the spatial location and time for crime i = 1, ..., n as s i and T i , respectively. The time is often not known exactly. In these cases, T i is interval censored, so we know only that
In addition to spatiotemporal information, crimes are associated with features X i = (X i1 , ..., X ip ) that describe the circumstances of the crime in terms of property type, point of entry, method of entry, and time of day. For our data all of these features are categorical so that
where N j is the number of levels for feature j.
For solved crimes, we have the identification number of the cluster/criminal (or group of criminals) G i ; for unsolved crimes G i is missing. We assume that the cluster labels
where M is the upper bound on the number of criminal groups responsible for the n crimes.
Denote the prior probability of crime i being attributed to cluster g as Prob(G i = g) = π g . The probability π g determines the expected proportion of the crimes in the dataset that are committed by cluster g. We model these probabilities as This assumption would be violated, for example, if certain criminals are simply better at evading detection than others. Though it is difficult to determine if this assumption holds in practice, our test set validation suggests robustness to this assumption for the burglary analysis in Section 4.
We model the remaining variables conditioned on the cluster index. The spatial and temporal distribution of the events for each cluster are assumed to be Gaussian,
where all spatial locations are projected so that ||s i − µ g || is given in kilometers. Censoring of the times T i is handled using latent variable methods as described in the Appendix. We denote the probability of a crime being level k ∈ {1, ..., N j } of feature j for cluster g as Prob(X ij = k|G i = g) = P kjg . Conditioned on the cluster indictor G i , the variables s i , T i , and X ij are mutually independent.
The spatiotemporal variability across clusters is determined by the cluster means µ g and θ g .
The cluster means are modeled as
In this The variation in the probabilities for the categorical covariates across clusters is also modeled hierarchically. Let P jg = (P 1jg , ..., P N j jg ) be the probabilities for cluster g for the N j levels of feature j. We assume 
The overall meansμ andθ have uniform priors over their domains. The spatial domain was taken to be the rectangle defined by the range of observed latitudes and longitudes.
We experimented with uninformative priors for the mean probabilities,P kj , but this led to poor convergence. Therefore, we elected to fix these hyperparameters at the sample proportionsP kj =
Analysis of Baltimore burglaries
In this section, we analyze the Baltimore burglary data described in Section 2. We begin by comparing several versions of the model in Section 4.1 to illustrate the relative importance of various model features. We then summarize the parameters in the final model in Section 4.2. To illustrate how this analysis could be used in practice, we perform crime series identification and crime classification in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
Model comparisons
We compare clustering models using test set validation. We evaluate models' performance to replicate classification of crimes known to be from the same cluster. Observations with known cluster index were randomly selected with probability 0.2 to be assigned to the test set, and the remaining observations with known labels and all observations with missing labels were assigned to the training set. After this initial randomization, observations in the test set with no observations in the training set from the same cluster were reassigned to the training set. This was repeated independently five times and the results below are averaged over the five test set datasets.
For each training set, we apply three special cases of the clustering model described in Section 3. The first model ("Spatial") uses only the spatial coordinates, s i , and discards temporal information T i and other features X i . The second model ("Spatiotemporal") includes both space and time, but ignores the other features. The full model ("Full") uses all available information as described in Section 3.
For each model and test set observation, let p ik be the posterior probability that observation i is assigned to cluster k and denote G i as the true cluster for observation i. We compare models using the average of p iG i , i.e., the posterior mean probability of the correct cluster ("P cor"), and the probability that p iG i is ranked in the top R of {p i1 , ..., p iM } ("P rank R"). By comparing results across multiple R, we are essentially computing the ROC statistics recommended by Bennell et al. (2009) . These statistics are averaged over the test set observations and the five random splits of the data. They are presented separately based on the number of observations in the training data with cluster index equal to G i .
To select the maximum number of clusters, M , we fit the spatiotemporal model with M = 2, 000, 4, 000, and 6, 000. We found that M = 4, 000 and M = 6, 000 were comparable, for example, the probability of the correct cluster ("P cor") averaged over all test set observations was 0.119, 0.130, and 0.132 for M = 2, 000, 4, 000, and 6, 000, respectively. Therefore, we used M = 4, 000 for the remaining analysis. Table 2 While the overall probability of the correct cluster is fairly low, the full model includes the correct cluster in the top 5 59.9% of the time and the top 25 74.9% of the time. Not surprisingly, the probability of the correct cluster increases with the number of observations from the cluster in the training set, as the characteristics of these criminals are estimated more precisely with a large sample. The probability of the correct cluster is very low for crimes with only a single observation in the training set (0.045 for the full model), but even for this challenging case the probability that the true cluster is ranked in the top 25 is 0.630, which may provide investigators useful information. Because of the way we defined groups to be the unique combination of co-offenders, Table 2 : Summary of test set clustering performance. "P cor" is the average posterior probability that observations are assigned to the correct cluster, and "P rank R" is the proportion of the observations where the correct cluster is one of the R clusters with highest posterior probability.
(a) All observations Model P cor P rank 1 P rank 5 P rank 10 P rank 25 
Summary of the final model
The posteriors of the full model parameters from the fit to the complete dataset are summarized in Table 3 . These results show the relative importance of each of the clustering features. The posterior mean of the within cluster spatial standard deviation isσ To illustrate the induced variability in the feature probabilities across clusters, Table 3 gives the 90% interval of P kjg , which represents the proportion of crimes with category k for feature j for an arbitrary criminal g. For example, the proportion of crimes committed at apartments varies from 0.001 for some criminals to 0.448 others. These probabilities show considerable variability across criminals, which supports the result that including these features in the analysis improves 
Crime series identification
To illustrate a typical crime series identification analysis, we analyze the three largest clusters of solved crimes, and the unsolved crimes associated with these clusters with posterior probability at least 0.8. Figure 4 plots the spatial and temporal locations of these clusters and the crimes attributed to these clusters. The second and third criminals' spatial locations (red and green) form tight clusters, and the event times for tight clusters for all three criminals. The circumstances of the crimes also follow a distinctive pattern. Of the 43 crimes in the first cluster, all 42 were committed in an apartment, 39 had "door" as the point of entry, and 29 had "pried" as the method of entry (11 others had forced physically). The four unsolved crimes associated with cluster 1 all fall in the center of the spatial cluster, occur in the same time window, were committed at an apartment with "door" as the point of entry, and two had "pried" as the method of entry (one had "forced physically", one was missing). The second cluster (red) also has a characteristic pattern.
All of the 31 crimes occurred in a garage with "door" as the point of entry and "other" as the method of entry. All unsolved events associated with this cluster share these features. The final cluster (green) is only associated with one unsolved crime. 
Crime classification
To illustrate crime classification, we select three unsolved crimes based on their probability of being linked with a solved crime, i.e., the posterior probability that their cluster G i includes at least one solved crime. We pick three crimes with probability 0.40, 0.98 and 0.99 to represent three likely scenarios. The data for these crimes and their likely clusters are given in Table 4 and Figure 5 .
The first unsolved crime is associated with no cluster of solved crimes with probability higher than 0.1. This crime is difficult to classify; its property type ("Other") and time ("Weekday/Day") are the most likely categories for these features. Therefore, a crime classification analysis is likely not useful for this case. However, this illustrates the importance of assigning uncertainty estimates to the clustering output, as this allows investigators to act on the results only when appropriate.
The second unsolved crime is linked with three clusters of solved crimes with probability between 0.101 and 0.127. As with the unsolved crime, these clusters of solved crimes are predominately committed in western Baltimore County, in single homes, and on weekday days. The clusters linked with the third unsolved crime form a tighter spatiotemporal cluster (green in Fig- ure 5) than for those of the other two crimes. This crime is associated with one cluster with probability 0.672. Both crimes in this cluster occur in a residential yard and with no force re-quired. Another cluster of solved crimes shares these features but is ranked only the third most likely, perhaps because it has only a single event, whereas the most likely cluster has two crimes and thus there is less uncertainty about its features.
Discussion
In this paper, we have shown how model-based clustering analysis can aid investigators in crime series identification and crime classification. Our hierarchical Bayesian model naturally handles missing data, interval censoring, and provides uncertainty estimates for all associations. For the Baltimore burglary case study, we demonstrate that this method is able to identify a short list of criminals which includes the true criminal with reasonably high probability.
We have focused our analysis on burglaries, but our model could also be applied to other crime types or even for crime series that include multiple crime types. Our model will accommodate any crimes that have spatial, temporal, and categorical attributes. The success of our approach with other crime types, locations, and time periods would need to be evaluated. Also, additional information could be included in our analysis to improve predictive performance. For example, considering more categories of the crime features type of property, point of entry, method of entry, or further spatial information such as distance to a major highway could improve clustering, especially for larger datasets. Because police data is not collected for the purpose of research, it may suffer from accuracy and coding reliability issues. Improving the quality of this data (e.g., reducing time intervals, geocoding improvements, checking coding reliability) has the potential to reduce uncertainty and improve results.
Another approach that would likely produce similar results is clustering via a Dirichlet process mixture prior (Ghosh and Ramamoorthi, 2003) . This has the advantage of avoiding an upper bound on the number of clusters. In our analysis, we found that results were not sensitive to the number of clusters, and so we elected to use the simpler finite mixture model. However, spatiotemporal clustering using nonparametric Bayesian methods is an area of future research.
Several methodological issues remain unresolved. For example, we must assume that all crimes are equally likely to be solved. In reality, it may be that larger clusters are more likely to be solved than small clusters or vice versa. One possibility would be to model the probability that a crime is solved using the known crime features such as spatiotemporal location and mode of entry. However, it is not clear that this would have any effect on the clustering results. Another issue is that we have assumed that observations are independent conditioned on the cluster label.
In practice it is likely that there is dependence between features within a cluster. Again, it is not clear what effect this would have on clustering results. Finally, it is not obvious how to deal with observations near the border. We have elected to include in the analysis solved crimes outside the study region that are linked to crimes inside the study region, but to exclude unsolved crimes outside the study region. In our study this represented only 0.7% of the solved crimes, but for other studies this issue may require careful consideration.
where G g = {i|G i = g} and |G g | is the number of elements in G g .
The full conditionals for hyperparameters with conjugate full conditionals are where Dir and Gam are the Dirichlet and gamma densities, respectively. We generate 25,000 samples from this model and discard the first 5,000 as burn-in. Convergence is monitored using trace plots of several representative parameters.
